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Abstract 
Modern medical monitor systems shoulder the responsibility of patients’ surveillance. Such life-critical systems 
steering by software will put patient’s life in peril if they try in vain to satisfy patient’s requirements. As a prelude to 
reliable software construction of such systems, formal specification of the software behavior has been noted as an 
effective method because it is susceptible of formal verification. Among other life-critical systems, Continuous 
Infusion Insulin Pump (CIIP) is a popular medical monitor system that shoulders the responsibility of diabetic’s 
sugar regulation. This paper aims to present a specification-based formal method to CIIP behavior as a prelude to 
the CIIP formal verification. 
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1. Introduction 
“Type 1 Diabetes” called youthful sugar and emerges in all ages, even though children, the youth, and ages of 
before thirty usually are afflicted with the disease. The CIIP system is intended to be worn continuously by a 
diabetic and the system administers regular doses of insulin based on regular sampling of the wearer’s blood-sugar 
level. Happened by taking a low-dose, an overdose, or unnecessary dose, monitoring the diabetic in vain is ended to 
diabetic’s affliction such as cerebral, eye, heart, or kidney diseases. Steered by software, among others medical   
systems, the CIIP system is one that its behavior should be accurately specified. Such specification leads to   
constructing reliable software to the system. To this end, we first consider the model we suggested in a recent book 
[1] and accordingly we specify a formal specification to the system behavior. 
Visually illustrated by two Petri-Net automata, the suggested model shows diabetic behavior and CIIP reaction to 
the diabetic. The first automaton includes diabetic’s high, normal, and low states and transition between them and 
the second one includes CIIP idle, sampling, computing, and delivering states and transitions between them. CIIP 
visits diabetic one per ten minutes and makes a transition to its desired state based on the visited state of the diabetic. 
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When the CIIP system is controlling the diabetic’s blood sugar, the physician expects that the following safety 
requirements should be satisfied. 
(SR1) “Blood sugar never falls below safe-min”, stated as (a),
(SR2) “The diabetic should not overdosed on insulin”, elicited from (b, c), 
(SR3) “The system should deliver no unnecessary insulin”, elicited from (c), 
(SR4) “The system should deliver no short of insulin”, elicited from (b, c). 
There are two other requirements not being the main requirements posed by the physician but imposed by 
physical constraints of the system. 
(SR5) “The system sensor should not be early in sampling”, 
(SR6) “The system sensor should not be late in sampling”, 
(SR7) “The system reservoir should not consist of insufficient insulin at the time of dose delivery”. 
Considering diabetic’s safety requirements, this paper aims to extract formal specification of the CIIP behavior 
from the automata states and transitions. The specification consists of rules stated by Relation 1. The relation states 
that CIIP should be held at state ɐ if event Ƚ happens where Ƚ indicates that diabetic makes a transition from its 
current state into some new state. 
@(V, W)o happen(DWtrigger(DV                                                                                           (1) 
2. Specification of system behaviour of an insulin pump with a timed Petri Net 
One of the problems to which diabetic patients are faced is that when their blood glucose rises they need an 
injection of a specified dose of insulin. The CIIP system is the system aimed to automate automated injection where 
the system every ten minutes takes a sample of the patient's blood and performs some computations on it. In the 
event of the patient needing insulin injection, the system injects the appropriate dose to patient’s body. It should be 
always kept in mind that errors arising in such a system might place the patient's life at risk.  We provide a model 
for the system behaviour via Petri Net. 
we define the Petri-Net of the CIIP system (depicted by Fig. 1) by the 5-tuple (P, T, F, W, M0) where, P={P(Diabetic),
P(System),  P(Reservoir)} where P(Diabetic)={P1,  P2,  P3},  P(System)={A1,  A2,  A3,A4},  and  P(Reservoir)={P'1, P'2}, T={T(Diabetic),
T(System),  T(Reservoir)}  where  T(Diabetic)= {T1,  T2,  T3,  T4,  T5},  T(System)= {T’1, T’2, T’3, T’4, T’5},  and  T(Reservoir)={T’’(1),
T’’(2), T’’(3)}, W:F՜1,  and  M0={M0(Diabetic),  M0(System),  M0(Reservoir)} where M0(Diabetic)={1,0,0}, M0(System)={1,0,0,0}, 
and M0(Reservoir)={1,0}, i.e. P1=1, A1=1, and P’1=1[1].  
Fig. 1. The CIIP System Behavioral Model [1]. 
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Initially, the diabetic is in the "High" state, which may: (1) stay in the same state or (2) change to the "Normal" state. 
According to physician (Section 1), each diabetic's state is a representation of a range of values; therefore, a change 
in the diabetic's sugar value may lead to the change or no change of the diabetic's current state. Accordingly, each 
transition is considered as a mapping from its input arc denoting an input value (shown by "a") into its output arc 
denoting an output value (shown by "b"). The mappings associated with Petri-Nets transitions of the diabetic and the 
system reservoir has been expressed in Fig 1. Transitions T1 and T4 in Fig. 1, for instance, indicate that although the 
sugar value increases or decreases, the value is still high/normal. However, Transition T2 in Fig. 1 indicates that a 
decrease in the sugar value leads to the change of the state. The "Low" state being a critical state cannot be managed 
by the system and so it may not be changed to the "Normal" state by the system. This state will appear if the diabetic 
is overdosed or unnecessarily dosed up by the system. 
The system is initially is in the "Idle" state and will change to the "Sampling" state (i.e. T'1 will  fire)  when  the  
system timer generates an interrupt event (indicated by Int.). The system will return to the "Idle" state from the 
"Sampling" state (i.e. T'2 will fire) when it identifies no increase in the diabetic's blood sugar and will change to the 
"Computing" state (i.e. T'3 will fire) when it identifies an increase. The system will change from the "Computing" 
state to the "Delivering" state (i.e. T'4 will fire) when the system reservoir has sufficient insulin. The system 
reservoir will stay in the "Sufficient" state while the computed dose is available to deliver [1]. 
3. Specification of safe behaviour of the CIIP system  
In the previous section, only the system operations were described paying no attention to its being safe or unsafe. 
Therefore, to better lucidity and intelligibility of the system's behaviour, the Petri Net visual method was used. 
However, it is necessary to distinguish safe cases of unsafe ones, so that appropriate decisions could be taken to deal 
with such situations. Therefore, in this section we will deal with this crucial state employing the state graph. 
In  safety  issues  regarding  diabetics  there  are  bad  events  which  should  not  occur.  In  other  words  one  should  not  
deviate from safety requirements. Therefore, we should specify the CIIP system behaviour leading to violations 
from safety issues. In this section, we draw the reachability graph (Fig. 2) for the Petri net. Since each of the tokens 
of the above-mentioned system can move from one location to another at various time conditions, a set of numerous 
and various states will be provided for the system. Now, we deal with unsafe paths leading to entry of the above said 
safety issues. Then using the graph states, requirements rules stated in Section 1 will be extracted according to 
Relation 1 so that the system does not enter unsafe paths. 
States P1, P2 and P3 the system states and P'1 and P'2 are the Reservoir ones and X indicates an unspecified state. We 
show that each state combination is in the form of s1, s2, s3 such that s1, s2 and s3 respectively belong to the Diabetic, 
system and the system reservoir. In Fig. 2, first the patient's blood glucose is assumed to be high (p1), system in the 
inactive state (A1) and reservoir is assumed to contain sufficient insulin (P'1). Therefore the reachability graph is 
drawn from this point. In table 1(a), based on safety requirements raised in introduction section, and hazardous 
behaviour identified in the reachability graph, rules will be extracted according to Relation 1 such that these rules 
warrant integrity of the CIIP system behaviour at run time. To extract the rules presented in table 1(a) consistent 
with Relation 1, we need events existing in CIIP system for specification of rules; accordingly, we classify them in 
table 1(b). To specify rules of table 1(a), we have used "~" as negation. Rules mentioned in table are appropriate to 
hazardous states in the reachability graph such that if these rules are continuously reconsidered during the run time, 
it will prevent the system to enter into hazardous states. 
4. Implementation of the Insulin Pump system 
In this section, employing the C# programming language we will proceed to implement the system behaviour 
from the Petri Net model and the system monitor based on the specifications mentioned in table 1(a). Note that due 
to programming complexities we will restrain to deal with details and will suffice to mention an example of the 
code. As it can be seen in code 1(b), the system's behaviour has been implemented from the Petri Net model where 
the system's monitor called Monitor() has been called. Through calling of the get sample() method, the system 
enters the sampling state. Following sampling, through calling the compute() method, the system enter the 
computation state. 
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Table 1.(a) Rules for test of integrity of CIIP system; (b) Events of CIIP system 
Table 2.Defined variables in codes 1 and 2.
                                                                                                             Fig. 2. Reachability graph of system CIIP. 
If the Monitor() returns the value zero, it means that a computation error has happened and the system's 
operations should be stopped. The while loop verifies that if sufficient insulin exists in the reservoir, insulin delivery 
should be done; otherwise the system should remain inactive from this state. If the system identified the need to 
inject insulin, through calling the inject() method, it enters the injection state. Finally through calling the update()
method, the system enters the update state and through calling the wait for Next period() method it waits until the 
next time interval for sampling arises. 
Extract Formal SpecificationViolated 
Safety 
Requirem
ent
Hazardous Path 
sequence 
#
@(P2,A1Ĳ)ר happens(Run-out ,Ĳ) ר triggers(Run-
out,A2) ר happens(Sample ,Ĳĺ ~@(A3Ĳ)
SR1XXXĺP3XX 1
@(P2,A3Ĳ) ר happens(Ovr ,Ĳ) ר~ triggers(Ovr 
,A4)ĺ~@(A4 , Ĳ) ר ~ happens(Inject ,Ĳ)
SR2P1XXĺP1A4;ĺP
2XXĺP3XX 
2
@(P1,A3Ĳ) ר~ happens(Ovr ,Ĳ) ר happens(NDose, 
Ĳ) ר triggers(NDose ,A4) ר @(P’1 ,Ĳ)ĺ @(A4 , Ĳ)
SR3P1XXĺP1XX
ש  XXXĺP3XX 
3
happens(NDose , Ĳ)ר triggers( NDose ,A4) ר @ 
(P’1 ,Ĳ) ĺ @(A4 , Ĳ)
SR4 P1XXĺP1XX
ש  XXXĺP3XX 
4
@(P1,A1Ĳ) ר happens(Run-out ,Ĳ) ר triggers(Run-
out,A2)ĺ@(A2 , Ĳ) ר  happens(Sample ,Ĳ)
SR5/SR6 XA1;ĺP1XX 
ש  XA1;ĺP3XX 
5
happens(NDose , Ĳ)ר triggers( NDose ,A4) ר
happens(DosAvl,Ĳ)ר@(P’1 ,Ĳ)ĺ @(A4 , Ĳ)ר
happens(Inject ,Ĳ)
SR7P1XXĺP1XX6
હ  Happens Event Description 
Run-
out
@T(હ) 10 min interval ends. 
Sample @T(હ) Sampling starts.
NDose @T(હ) It is revealed that the 
compute insulin level 
is positive. It is 
revealed that the 
computed insulin level 
is zero .
Ovr @T(હ) It is revealed that the 
compute value of 
insulin is abnormal. 
Inject @T(હ) Injection is done 
DosAvl @T(હ) It is revealed that 
sufficient insulin for 
injection is available 
in the reservoir. 
Variable Name Explanation 
insulinAvailable Amount of insulin available in the 
reservoir. 
computedDose Amount of computed dose. 
cumulativeDose Amount of cumulative dose. 
injectionDose Amount of dose to be injected.
safeMin Blood glucose level less this value is 
considered as low.
safeMax Blood glucose values higher than this 
level is considered as high 
maxSingleDose Maximum permissible units in each 
injection dose 
minimumDose Minimum inject able dose.
sample Sampling amount. 
systemStatus Current status of system in the general 
state .
S.M. Babamir, M. Borhani Dehkordi / Procedia Computer Science 3 (2011) 1304–1309 1307
Babamir and Borhani/ Procedia Computer Science 00 (2010) 000–000 
Code 1. (a) implementation pf the system's monitor;                       (b) safe implementation of the system along with monitor call. 
Code 1(a) is the system's implementation monitor and has been written based on specification presented in table 
1(a), i.e. it takes care that no unauthorized dose is injected to the patient and verifies the permitted dose considering 
the blood sugar level. Specification of global variables defined in codes 1 (a) and (b) are presented in tables 2. Table 
3 shows result of implementing the CIIP system where the maximum injected dose is four units in each dose. Also, 
the  amount  of  injected  units  in  each dose  depends  on  the  two previous  sampling  results.  In  this  table,  results  are  
presented in columns Info, Warning, and Error such that the column relates to the injected dose to the patient based 
on his/her blood glucose level. The Warning column relates to the time when the patient's blood glucose is less than 
normal values and the column Error relates to errors happening to the system such as: Error occurring in the insulin 
reservoir, error arising in the sampling sensor, error arising in the in satin system, error occurring in the device 
batteries, and etc.
5. Conclusions and Related Work
Since the CIIP system undertakes controlling the diabetic’s blood sugar, the physician expects that the some 
safety requirements should be satisfied. To this end, based on the model we suggested in a recent book [1], this 
paper presented a specification-based formal method to CIIP behavior that can be used to the CIIP formal 
verification. Visually illustrated by two Petri-Net automata, the suggested model showed diabetic behavior and CIIP 
reaction to the diabetic. The first and the second automata include Diabetic and CIIP states and transition between 
them respectively. In constrast with some other methods, this paper made contribution, specification of high-level 
safety requirements by physician language and specification system by a visual modeling.The first case, i.e. the high
private int MONITOR () 
        {
                            if (sample < safeMin) 
            { 
                if (injectionDose != 0) 
                { 
                   systemStatus = "error"; 
            output = "There are some computing errors."; 
                   return (0);                 
                } 
            }
            else if (sample >=  safeMin &&  
                        sample <= safeMax) 
            { 
            if (injectionDose != 0 && injectionDose != 1) 
                { 
                   systemStatus = "error"; 
            output = "There are some computing errors."; 
                   return (0);                 
                } 
            } 
            else if (sample >  safeMax) 
            { 
                if (injectionDose > maxSingleDose) 
                { 
                   systemStatus = "error"; 
            output = "There are some computing errors."; 
                   return (0);                                 
                 }
            } 
            else 
            { 
                return (1); 
            }             
        }
private void operation() 
        { 
            systemStatus = "runningAutomatic"; 
            getSample();             
            compute();             
            if (MONITOR() == 0) 
            { 
                return; 
            }             
            while (insulinAvailable < injectionDose) 
            {
outputText1 = "Amount of insulin in resource is 
                                          very low.";                 
                systemStatus = "error";                 
            }             
            systemStatus = "runningAutomatic"; 
            if (injectionDose!= 0) 
            { 
                Inject(); 
            }             
            update(); 
            waitForNextPeriod();   
        }
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Table 3. result of execution of implemented system with random values 
level specifications are intelligible to the physician. In [9], Wang et al have just addressed modeling the Insulin 
Pump behavior using the SOFL formal languge. Similarly, Sommerville has used the Z formal language to specify 
the system and the safety requirements [10]. The second case, i.e. using a visual method made the benefit of the 
lucid understanding of the system behaviour than the textual methods such as those applied in [4, 5].  
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LOG TYPEStatus
Info ErrorWarningInformationError Warning 
X
Injection 
dose
Blood 
sugar 
1
101054
1,3 
0034
1,3 
0020
1
1
101055
1
1or3 3
0
3
34
67
1
1or 2 3
0
8
20
102
2
1
2223
1,3 1or3 
0
3
0
67
12
1,3 
1- Available Insulin is very 
low. Please charge it to 
continue.  
2- “Error” status occurred 
because a hardware problem. 
1- Available Insulin is 
low. Please charge it.. 
2- Your sugar is low. 
Please call your doctor. 
You don’t need any 
injection. 
3- Cumulative dose will 
arrived bigger than max 
daily allowed dose. 
System allowed 
injecting only 25 dose.
1- Your sugar 
is normal. 
You may 
need insulin 
in X dose.  
2- Your sugar 
is High. You 
may need 
insulin in X
dose. 
3- You don’t 
need any 
injection. 
1or 2 
20
8
0
102
5
3
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